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ABSTRACT

George Herbert Mead's theory of mind, self, and society is synthesized in this paper, as is the extension of that basic theory by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. The paper argues that Mead's functionalist perspective, while rich and internally consistent, is naive in that it lacks a theory of institutions, and it shows how Berger and Luckmann's addition of a theory of institutions to Mead's symbolic-interactionist perspective provides a foundation on which to erect a paradigm for the study of modern life and for the study of mass communication, a key institution in modern society. It notes that such a paradigm can explain the sociocultural world as a human construction that is powerfully disruptive and fragmenting at both societal and individual levels. The paper also suggests types of mass media study that might derive from such a paradigm, observing that the mass media might be examined as amplifiers of conflicting sets of messages from modern institutions or as cultural forms in themselves. It concludes that any investigation of the mass media must begin with the premise that media in the United States are driven by a profit motive and hence cannot serve to amplify the plight and the needs of all sectors of society, including, for example, the economically disadvantaged. (Author/GT)

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Homelessness in Modern Society:

An Integration of Mead and Berger

And Implications for a Paradigm of Mass Communication

by

Charlotte Jones

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The members of the Chicago School, working as they did during a period of rampant social change, took as their task the study of modernization and its ramifications for social life. Social philosophers on both sides of the Atlantic saw traditional society crumbling away and feared that with it would go the secure sense of community and, indeed, the sense of self believed to characterize traditional society. The traditional social order, based on the emotional ties of neighborliness and love, was being replaced by an order premised on the division of labor, characterized by the callous metaphor of the contract.

Against this backdrop, the Chicago School saw the biggest challenge of the 20th Century as the conversion, in John Dewey's terms, of the Great Society into the Great Community.[1] Dewey's life was largely devoted to devising a means for building the Great Community out of the fabric of modern life. While he was providing the range and vision for that dream, Dewey's colleague, George Herbert Mead, was developing in analytical depth and scientific precision a theory of mind, self, and society which offered a means for the emergence of the community sought by Dewey.[2] Social theorists owe many debts to the seminal work of Mead. He was able to show that mind and self are, without residue, social emergents, thus offering a resolution to the problem of mind-body dichotomy; and he showed that it is language that provides the mechanism for this emergence.

Despite these considerable achievements, however, Mead's conception of community, heroic and internally consistent as it is, has not stood the test

of time. Mead's functionalist view of social order and the concomitant view of the unified self, cannot stand as a description of the evolution of modern life. The most serious flaw in Mead's conception (as well as the literature of the Chicago School generally) is its lack of a plausible theory of institutions and their powerful disruptive nature at both the level of society and individual consciousness. Peter Berger recognized that Mead's conception, rich as it is on one level, is naive without such a theory. He and Thomas Luckmann attempted to rectify that flaw in The Social Construction of Reality.[3] It appears, however, that Berger himself did not at first fully realize the degree to which institutions do disrupt modern life. But in a more recent work with the suggestive title, The Homeless Mind,[4] Berger and two co-authors move even further from Mead's original conception of a unified self and society. They challenge whether in modern society a sense of self in Mead's terms is at all possible.

The task here is to explicate in simple terms the theory of self and society developed by Mead and much modified by Berger and others, and to suggest that the theory may provide the appropriate starting point for the study of modern social life in general and the study of communication in specific.

Mead's Mind, Self, and Society

Mead's painstaking account of mind, self, and society is, paradoxically, detailed and complex on the one hand and lucid and simple on the other. The key features can be summarized as follows. Mead's theory draws upon Darwin; he and other pragmatists tried to reinterpret the concepts of mind, self, and society as emerging from a biological process. Unlike his predecessors who conceived of mind or selves as existing prior to the social process and who

therefore could not explain their origin, Mead shows that the mind and self are social emergents, and that language in the form of the vocal gesture provides the mechanism for their emergence. Mead sees all experience as accessible through conduct, and thus calls his approach social behaviorism. Mead's emphasis on the social is crucial: his approach is a refutation of Watsonian behaviorism which denies that the mental sphere can be understood through conduct. In Mead's assessment, Watson abstracted the individual act from the larger social act and in so doing could not explain individual behavior. Mead's argument rests on the conception that the individual and society exist always in a dialetic.[5]

Mead's theory builds upon itself. The mind emerges prior to the self. The biologic individual becomes minded when the mere conversation of gestures is transformed into significant symbols through the agency of language. The conversation of gestures is the most primitive form of communication, existing even in the animal world, when, for example, one dog reacts to the behavior of another in a dog fight. Such communication does rest on symbols since the gestures do stand for and cause the animal to act. But the symbols are not significant symbols in the sense that the animal has the meanings of his gestures in his mind. For the symbols to become significant, the individual's gesture must call out in himself the same response it calls out in the other, therefore allowing the individual to control his gestures on that basis. Significant symbols emerge in the social realm through the agency of language and the individual becomes minded when he has internalized these significant symbols. Mind thus becomes social. A person is minded when he can assume the roles of others and control his own behavior in terms of others. He has developed consciousness.[6]

It is through such role-taking that a person develops not only consciousness, but self-consciousness. The person develops a self when he can become an object to himself. By taking the role of the other, the person can look back at and respond to himself from the perspective of the other and so become an object to himself. Again, the self, like the mind, develops in the social process. There are two stages in the development of the self: the stages of play and the game. In play, the child assumes one role after another of persons in his life. But in the game, one has become all of the others around him. In the game, one must have within himself the whole of organized activity in order to correctly play his own part. In the game, unlike play, the person assumes not merely the role of a specific other, but of all the others in the game. He has generalized the attitude of role-taking. In one of Mead's key concepts (and one which ultimately proves problematic), the individual has taken the role of the generalized other. Taking over the organized attitudes of others in the social setting constitutes the "me." This socially derived "me" is reacted to by the "I." The "I" calls out the social self and responds to it. The self is essentially a dialetical process going on within these two phases. The "I" is the individual's response to the generalized other. In Mead's terms, we can only have ideas, or we can only think, insofar as we are able to take the attitude of the generalized other and respond to it. The "I", then, is that part of the self which allows for creative and novel behavior. This is the driving force of social change. The "I" allows for behavior which is not controllable by the generalized other. The complete self has both an "I" and a "me," again emphasizing the dialectical relationship between society and the individual.[7]

Inasmuch as Mead's concepts exist in a dialetic, the basis of social order which derives from Mead's theory of mind and self should be readily obvious. In Mead's conception the individual takes on the role of the others in society, and thereby regulates his part in the social act. Society has thus implanted itself within its component parts --individuals --and is thereby able to regulate their actions. Mead thus conceives of both society and the individual consciousness as integrated and unified. The self has taken the attitudes of others and has in fact become the others. The values of the others are its own. This unified society of selves, Mead argued, could make possible the democratic ideal earnestly sought by the Chicago School.[8]

Mead's conception of community and the democratic ideal is a community comprised of functionally interdependent and integrated individuals. Mead said that such a society was achievable in modern life if caste systems which segmented society into groups could be eliminated. The individual, rather than belonging to a specific caste or group set against other groups, would be distinguished by a functional difference which would bring him closer to others rather than separating him. This difference of occupation or function, Mead said, ". . .does not preclude a common experience; it is possible for the individual to put himself in the place of the other although his function is different from the other."[9] Mead believed in fact that the ideal of human community rested on the attainment of functional differentiation and social participation in the full degree. He said: "The implication of democracy is . . .that the individual can be as highly developed as lies within the possibilities of his own inheritance, and still can enter into the attitudes of the others whom he affects."[10] The individual's uniqueness must not, however, be alien to the rest of society. He must remain an organic part of society in

in order to retain a self. The author or artist must have his audience in order to find himself in his individual creation as appreciated by others; what the individual accomplishes is social.[11] Occupational groups must remain free of the caste system which characterized them earlier. Mead said:

> It is essential that the other members of the community shall be able to enter into the attitude of the laborer in his functions. . . . The caste organization tended to separate in the selves the essential function of the individuals so that one could not enter into the other.[12]

In sum, Mead saw modern society exhibiting

> . . .constant evolution of human social organization in the direction of greater and greater relational unity and complexity, more and more closely knit interlocking and integrated unifying of all the social relations of interdependence which constitute it.[13]

Mead was careful to observe that such an ideal had not yet been achieved fully at the time of those lectures. Society had not yet made it possible for all of its members to enter into the attitudes of all others. The mechanism for this achievement lay in a better system of communication, presumably the mass media. Such a system, if theoretically perfect, would create universal discourse so that the individual would affect himself as he affects others in every way. Communication, in this framework, becomes the organizing force in the community.[14] Thus, we find in Mead a tendency toward pastoralism. Looking ever backward, Mead believed the solution to the crisis of modern life lay in restoring the social order and ideals seen in traditional society. Community could be salvaged, therefore, by better communication, since communication is the key to social integration and order. The great irony of the Chicago School, as seen in Mead and notably in Dewey, lies in its prescription of more technology --the technology of the mass media --as the solution for the effects of the technological society.

Mead's theory of an integrated social order and, hence, an integrated self rests on the notion of a constant dialectic between individual and the generalized other. The individual has taken on the roles of the generalized other in the form of a "me." But the "I" understands the generalized other and can work to change it. Within such a conceptual framework, the relationship between the individual and the society or generalized other is tenuous, easily changeable and almost playful. Since the individual constantly interacts with and takes society into himself he can understand himself as being a reflection of that ordered society, the generalized other. What Mead did not take into account, and what Berger and Luckmann attempted to address in The Social Construction of Reality, was the fact that the dialectic between the individual and the generalized other does not retain a tenuous, playful character as argued by Mead.[15] That is true only initially, before the various roles comprising the generalized other are institutionalized and passed on to the next generation as hardened, objective fact. Berger and Luckmann offered, in complex detail, a theory of how these roles are formed initially and then transformed into institutionalized spheres of social life.

In an extended example, Berger and Luckmann try to show how this process of institutionalization occurs. For purposes of illustration, they propose an assumption that two persons from entirely different social worlds begin to interact. The two individuals --A and B --have already formed selves, but in segregated social worlds, say, one on Earth and the other on Mars. As A and B interact, they soon start to produce typifications of the other. A watches B perform. He attributes motives to B's actions and, seeing the actions recur, typifies the motives as recurrent. A assumes that B is, in turn, attributing motives toward his own actions. Soon A and B start to play roles toward one

another. A will inwardly appropriate B's roles and make them the model for his own role-playing. For example: A takes over B's role or means of preparing food. He makes B's role in cooking a model for his own role-playing. B is, at the same time, taking on the roles of A. By each individual taking on the various roles of the other, they gain the advantage of being able to understand and predict the other's actions. Their life together takes on a widened sphere of taken-for-granted routines. A and B have agreed collectively what certain actions will mean. In Mead's framework, they have constructed significant symbols so that A's actions call out the same response in A as they do in B. A has taken on the roles of B and now controls his action in terms of those roles. Carried one step further, A and B can internalize the generalized other and become an object to themselves. They can develop a self.[16]

But Berger and Luckmann carry this admittedly simplistic paradigm further. They posit an assumption that A and B have children. Until now, A and B, as the only participants in the world, have lived in constant dialectic. They know that "what an action means" is arbitrary and can be changed. A and B have shaped this world and it is fully transparent to them. They have a shared biography. Upon having children, however, A and B find it necessary that their children also know what actions mean. They pass on their already constructed sets of meanings. For the children, this world has been institutionalized. What actions mean no longer retains an arbitrary, accessible nature. Rather, the child confronts a world that says this is the "way things are to be done." The child's world is an objective, coercive fact. The child confronts a world that is external and largely opaque. It is a reality, but not one that the child has helped construct.[17]

The mere fact of institutionalization does not seem to unduly threaten Mead's framework, although the dialectical interplay has been largely eliminated. What Berger and Luckmann have termed institutionalization seems to be merely "hardened," unyielding significant symbols. In Mead's terms, the child must internalize these significant symbols in order to become minded and, in turn, to develop a self. It would seem that the child could as well internalize institutions, even though he does not understand their source, and in so doing the child could obtain a self no less secure and valid that that of A and B. But to come to that conclusion is to misunderstand the very significance and nature of institutionalization, of inheriting a world which one has not helped create. The ramifications of institutionalization undermine any efforts to salvage Mead's functional social order and integrated self, as Berger, et al., were to conclude some years later.

It is interesting to note that in The Social Construction of Reality, Berger and Luckmann threw out, almost as an aside, a warning that the complex of institutions in a given society should not be assumed a priori to ". . . 'hang together' functionally, let alone as a logically consistent system." Nevertheless, the authors argued that ". . .the empirical fact remains that institutions do tend to 'hang together.'"[18] They said that individuals perform discrete, institutionalized actions and then, through reflection, integrate their actions into a meaningful, coherent whole. Integration is not a functional imperative since the various institutions could survive without integration. But members of society do, by reflective consciousness, create a subjectively meaningful universe whose meanings are socially shared. The authors were not sure why humans are driven to impose a meaningful logic on the institutional order. They suspect it may derive from a psychological need

grounded, in turn, in a physiological need. Whatever the reason, Berger and Luckmann argued, humans, through a legitimating process, are able to provide an overall canopy to hold these disparate sectors of experience together. Berger and Luckmann alluded to the increasing difficulty in modern, industrial life of integrating the plurality of "sub-universes" of meaning. They admitted that this phenomenon increases the problem of establishing a stable symbolic canopy for the entire society. But while they saw legitimation as increasingly difficult, they retained a belief that it was both possible and necessary for society.[19] Berger, et al., directly confront the dilemma of modern life and consciousness in The Homeless Mind and are forced to reassess the viability of legitimation in modern society.

Institutions and the Componential Self in Modern Life

In The Homeless Mind, Berger, et al., attempt to locate the primary institutions in modern industrial society and to show how these affect conscicusness--in Mead's terms, the self. Thus, they are not interested in modernization as the effect of technology on economic growth, as has been the focus of most previous studies of modernization. Like the previous studies, however, they begin with the belief that the primary institution of modern life is technological production. Their goal is to describe the effects of technology on the spheres of modern life and, in turn, describe the effects on consciousness.[20]

One of the most important effects wrought by the technologized society is the dichotomization of the work world from the home world. Further, within each of these spheres there is further pluralization or componentiality so that an individual's consciousness becomes irretrievably fragmented. In the tech-

nologized work world, the average worker,[21] is a mere cog in a larger process. The individual worker's job is a step in a sequence, e.g., step four in a sequence of twelve steps. Thus, the worker's job is a component of a larger process, but the worker cannot visualize the end result of his labor. The reality of work is segmented into components which can be assembled in various ways so there is no necessary relationship between a particular sequence of actions and the end of these actions. For example, a particular assemblage of cogs produced in a highly specific production sequence may go either into an automobile or a nuclear weapon, and the worker's approval or even knowledge of the intended usage is unnecessary for the appropriate performance of his role. The character of this knowledge which governs work has far-reaching implications for the manner in which different sectors of life are represented in consciousness. The knowledge related to the work process represents a very specific segment of the individual's life and only that segment. The worker's knowledge of assembling cogs does not pertain in any way to the individual's family life. The specific nature of this knowledge assigns it to a segregated sphere within the consciousness.

Technological production also affects social relations. Workers, in order to get the task done, must regard each other as anonymous functionaries. A worker's emotional feeling for his co-workers must be minimized; otherwise, production might be threatened, for instance, by a refusal to "work with Polacks." This anonymity of social relations can be carried over to the individual's experience of himself. The individual can become a worker to himself more easily than he can relate to others who have, say, a peculiar sense of humor since those more concrete expressions have been suppressed. The self now is experienced in a partial and segmented way. The componentiality characteristic of the worker's job and componentiality of his social relations with

co-workers has now been transferred to the individual's experience of himself.[22]

Not only is the work world segmented from the home world, but within the home world there is considerable pluralization. Berger says that there is a tendency for the modern individual to try to arrange his home world so that it will offer an integrated order of meanings which will offset his bewildering, segmented world of work. But this unity is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve in modern life. In earlier times, individuals lived in life-worlds that were more or less unified by an integrating order, usually religious. This meant that the same integrative symbols permeated the various sectors of everyday life, giving the individual the sense of always being in the same world. In modern life, however, everyday life is segmented into severely discrepant worlds of meaning and experience. This phenomenon, the authors contend, is endemic to two specifically modern experiences: urban life and the technology of mass communication.

The city is the meeting place for discrepant worlds. Urban dwellers are forced to be "urbane" in their acceptance of those whose ideas about reality differ from their own. The mass media spread this urbanization of consciousness to those in small towns and the farms. The cognitive and normative definitions of reality invented in the city are rapidly diffused. The authors contend:

> Plurality is intrinsic to this process. The individual, wherever he may be, is bombarded with a multiplicity of information and communication. . . /which/ weakens the integrity and plausibility of his home world.[23]

This pluralization has obvious implications for the development of the self: Mead's conception of the self is undermined. There is little chance for individuals in these circumstances ever to possess an integrated home world if,

from childhood, the individual is bombarded with a multiplicity of worlds. Because the pluralism of modern society is constantly changing, modern identity likewise is remarkably open to change. There is thus a permanent identity crisis.

The transience and plurality of modern life lead the authors to re-evaluate the viability of the concept of legitimation which serves to integrate the various institutional sectors of life. It becomes difficult, if not impossible, for the individual to integrate his world through reflection. The authors confess that ". . .not only the world but the self becomes an object of deliberate attention and sometimes anguished scrutiny." Religion, which throughout most of history served as a sacred canopy --the ultimate legitimation--providing the sense of being at "home" is eroded in modern life.[25]

In sum, social life is now comprised of a hodge-podge of widely discrepant meanings and bodies of knowledge which cannot be reconciled. Our knowledge of work is so specialized as to isolate us from the work worlds of others. And our knowledge of work has no significance for our private lives, though the segmenting effect on consciousness carries over. The private side of life, pluralized as it is, and stripped of its sacred (or even secular) canopy, offers no solace, no place to come home to. Whatever the memberships in groups or the adherence to beliefs, these cannot be reconciled without contradiction. And even if they could be, it would take a strong bond for them to adhere in the face of constant challenge by opposing beliefs. There are too many "others" to be generalized.

One could argue with the substantive position taken by The Homeless Mind. The authors welcome such criticism, admitting that in the absence of firm empirical evidence the theoretical framework is tenuous and hypothetical. One might

argue that the sense of homelessness has been exaggerated and that there are numerous enclaves within the larger society that retain a sacred or secular canopy. And it could be argued that too sharp a distinction has been drawn between the work and home worlds. We do, after all, form friendships with our co-workers which no work setting can eradicate completely. The Homeless Mind may have to be modified therefore as its theoretical basis is tested.

Implications for Study

A polarization emerges from a contrasting of Berger's and Mead's works: Mead holds out hope for a unified society of selves; Berger, who has had the advantage of hindsight and the experience of the ramifications of modern life, offers little such hope. Despite their differences, the two stand in a tradition which understands the appropriate starting point for a study of the social realm. Mead's great contribution was to show the social world as being, without residue, a product of humans--a social construction. Berger and others, by adding a theory of institutions, demonstrates how a world of our own construction becomes a mystery to us.

The tendency of some contemporary theories of culture is to explain the social world as superorganic, an insidious force lying outside of us and controlling our lives. But any study of social life must begin with the understanding that it is a product of humans --and a social one. The social world is embodied by those who live in it. To deny that society is a social construction renders one powerless to explain the origin of such a world: the tendency is to revert to explanations which lead us back to the mind-body problem--driving the problem back into the head. At the same time, to recognize society as a human product does not mean such a world is transparent. Quite

the opposite is true. The social world is opaque and its inhabitants can be understood as trying to make sense of it out of webs of meaning that they have spun but do not now understand. The social product now acts back on them.

If one accepts this as a plausible description of modern life, there remains the problem of devising a program for study. The sheer complexity of modern life with its institutionalized spheres and multitude of forms makes one wonder whether a reductionist explanation --usually deemed necessary to render our study scientific --is possible or even laudable. Cassirer wrestled with this dilemma in An Essay on Man.[26] He asked: "Can we be content with counting up in a merely empirical manner the different impulses that we find in human nature?" He concluded that we could not and added that ". . .for a really scientific insight these impulses would have to be classified and systematized."[27] Without such a classification system to lead us out of this labyrinth, we lack all conceptual unity. But Cassirer warns against theories which become ". . . a Procrustean bed on which the empirical facts are stretched to fit a preconceived pattern."[28] Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx each believed that he had located ". . . the hidden driving force which sets the whole mechanism of our thought and will in motion."[29] But Cassirer notes:

> The principal aid of all these theories was to prove the unity and homogeneity of human nature. But if we examine the explanations which these theories were designed to give, the unity of human nature appears extremely doubtful. . . .Every philosopher believes he has found the mainspring and master-faculty. . . .But as to the character of this master-faculty all the explanations differ widely from, and contradict, one another.[30]

The task, he argues, is not to try to find an inner unity among the various symbolic forms or institutionalized spheres of life --of myth, language, art, religion, history, science --for we won't find it. But while there is no homogeneity among the sectors of life, there is a unity of sorts. It is a

a functional unity, he argues. Human life, to be liberated, requires a ". . . multiplicity of its constituent parts. For this is a dialectic unity, a co-existence of contraries."[31] To understand human culture is to recognize that these forms represent different aspects of our nature, different needs. Out of these disparate elements we build up a world. Cassirer argues that philosophy will one day be able to find a fundamental unity among these forms: "a hidden harmony."[32]

It still seems premature to tell whether such a unity exists or, if it does, whether we can locate it. For now, the appropriate task seems to be one of studying these forms, these institutions of life, in and for themselves. To continue to seek unity in simplicity would be fruitless. Single-variable explanations --be it Freud's sexual instinct or Nietzsche's will to power -- will not explain the scope and complexity of social life.

This conceptual framework holds as well for the study of communication. Communication, in the tradition of the Chicago School and its descendants, including Berger, comes close to being synonymous with cultural life itself. As Dewey put it, societies exist in communication; the lifeblood of society is its significant symbols. From Berger's and Cassirer's viewpoint, there is no single set of integrative symbols. Rather, there are several. The various institutionalized sectors or forms of life have their own sets of symbols. So we see the dilemma facing social science generally --the lack of integration between forms --is equally present in the study of communication if communication is taken to be a study in the use of significant symbols.

The implications for the study of the mass media are even more interesting and complex. In Mead's and Dewey's framework, mass communication meant simply an amplification in the use of these symbols. But, within the framework de-

veloped here, two approaches to the media appear plausible. If one looks at the mass media as amplifiers, then credence must be given to Berger's homeless mind thesis. In these terms, the media are bombarding us with conflicting sets of significant symbols from the various institutions of modern life. Inasmuch as the institutions themselves are incongruent so are the messages that we receive from them. But a second and perhaps a more plausible approach to understanding the nature of the mass media is to consider mass communication itself as a cultural form, rather than an amplifier. It is difficult to offer a conjecture as to the nature of this form, but in a capitalist society where the mass media are big business, it seems safe to assume that any understanding must recognize that the mass media, at their base, are driven by an economic motive. Whatever the media may be as by-products, the fact remains that their products are designed to make a profit.

If one adopts this approach, rather than the amplifier approach, the implications become clear. There is no mandate, given in the nature of the form itself, that all the forms of social life be equally represented in the mass media, or, indeed, that they be represented at all. Why should the media, whose purpose is to sell and to continue to sell consumer goods, concern themselves with the fact that in America alone thousands of people are literally starving to death and millions more are barely subsisting? Such coverage is at odds with the media's purpose. Thus the media themselves attest to the dilemma of selflessness and discredit Mead's hope for a functionally integrated society in which everyone would understand one another. With ignorance --as in the hidden plight of large segments of the population -- there can be no empathy.

Notes

1
See John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Chicago: The Swallow Press, 1954).

2
See George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, ed. Charles W. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934). This observation was made by Morris in the introduction to the collection of lectures of Mead's which comprise Mind, Self, and Society.

3
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Anchor Books, 1967).

4
Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger and Hansfried Kellner, The Homeless Mind (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).

5
For a good comparison of Mead and Watson, see Anselm Strauss, The Social Psychology of George Herbert Mead (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 129-130, and Part I, Mind, Self, and Society. Also see, George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, ed. Charles W. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), Chapter 1.

6
See Mind, Self, and Society, pp. xx-xxiii, and Part I.

7
Ibid., pp. xxiii-xxv, and Part III.

8
Ibid., Part IV.

9
Ibid., p. 325.

10
Ibid., p. 326.

11
Ibid., p. 324.

12
Ibid., p. 325.

13
Ibid., pp. 310-311.

14 Ibid., pp. 327-328.

15 Berger and Luckmann did not explicitly confront this problem in Mead's work, but their discussion of institutionalization points up the basic flaw in his conception of social order.

16 The situation of A and B, as the authors note, is paradigmatic of the institutionalization occurring in larger societies. The example is kept simple to enhance understanding.

17 This discussion was taken from The Social Construction of Reality, pp. 53-61.

18 Ibid., p. 63.

19 Ibid., p. 86.

20 The Homeless Mind, pp. 8-10. A study of modern consciousness was not the original intent of the authors. Rather, it was a fruitful by-product of a study of modernization and consciousness in the Third World.

21 This description is not intended to describe all workers in technological society. It is intended as a very generalized description of the average worker.

22 This discussion was taken from The Homeless Mind, pp. 23-40. The authors also discuss the political bureaucracy as another major institution of the public sphere of life, though one less significant in its effects upon consciousness than technology.

23 Ibid., p. 67.

24 Ibid., pp. 79-82.

25 Ibid.

26 Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944).

[27] Ibid., p. 20.

[28] Ibid., p. 21.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid., p. 222.

[32] Ibid., p. 223.